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WHEN IS CUMULATIVE VOTING PREFERABLE TO
SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTING?
MICHAEL E. LEWYN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

An election system violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act [hereinafter "Section 2"1 if it hinders racial groups' right to "elect the
representatives of their choice."' The purpose of Section 2 is to prohibit
electoral arrangements which "dilute" (i.e., diminish) 2 the voting power
of racial minority groups. For example, at-large election systems (which
allow every voter to vote for as many candidates as there are legislative
seats to be filled in an entire jurisdiction)3 often violate Section 2 by
allowing a cohesive racial majority to elect every single legislator, thereby
leaving racial minorities unrepresented. 4 Section 2 also prohibits singlemember districting plans5 which dilute minority votes. 6
The traditional remedy for vote dilution has been the creation of
"majority minority" single-member districts. 7 Typically, courts and legislators have tried to create enough majority minority districts to give
minorities proportional representation in legislatures. 8 However, single* Attorney, Mullin, Rhyne, Emmons and Topel, P.C., Washington, D.C. Formerly Visiting
Assistant Professor, University of Miami School of Law; Law Clerk to Judges Morris Arnold (8th
Cir.) and Theodore McMillian (8th Cir.). B.A., Wesleyan University, J.D. University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (Supp. V 1993).
2. Vote dilution has been defined as "a 'process whereby election laws or practices ... combine
with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable [racial or political majority] group to diminish
the voting strength of at least one other group."' Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting
as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L.& POL.
469, 470 n.3 (1989) (quoting DAVIDSON, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 1, 4 (C. Davidson ed. 1984).
3. Id. at 469.
4. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (citations omitted). For the same reason,
multimember districts (which allow each voter within a district to vote for as many candidates as
there are seats to be filled) often violate Section 2. Id. Specifically, the Court has held that
multimember districts and at-large elections violate Section 2 when "a bloc, voting majority . . . [is
generally] able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority
voting group." Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
5. A single-member districting plan divides a municipality or state into districts, each of which
is represented by one legislator. Thus, single-member districting may increase minority representation
by allowing the legislature to create districts dominated by minority groups. See LANi GUtNIER, THE
TYRANNY

OF THE MAJORITY:

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

53 (1994).

6. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1993). A single-member districting plan
can dilute minority strength either by (1) packing a minority group into a small number of districts
(thereby depriving it of a majority in other districts) or (2) fragmenting the minority group so it
constitutes a majority in no district. Id.
7. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 50.
8. Id. at 53. However, proportional representation is neither necessary nor sufficient to preclude
Section 2 liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (proportionality not required); Johnson v. De Grandy,
114 S. Ct. 2647, 2661 (1994) (proportionality is "obviously an indication" that Section 2 has been
complied with, but is not always dispositive).
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member districting has not always increased minority representation, because minority voters are sometimes so geographically dispersed that no
majority minority district can be created. 9 Even where Section 2 has
increased minority representation, it has also forced legislatures to create
unsightly 10 (and arguably unconstitutional)" gerrymanders in order to
create a large number of majority minority districts.
The defects of single-member districting have caused some commentators
(most notably Lani Guinier)12 to endorse a system known as "cumulative
voting" as a remedy for Section 2 violations. Under cumulative voting,
as in a traditional at-large election, voters may vote for several candidates.
However, voters also have the option of "cumulating" their votes by
3
casting several votes ("plumping") for one or more candidates. For
example, suppose City X has a five-member city council. Under traditional
at-large voting, each voter could cast one vote for as many as five
candidates, and the five candidates with the most votes would win. By
contrast, under cumulative voting, each voter would have five votes but
would have the option of casting multiple votes for one or more candidates. Thus, the voter could cast all five votes for his first choice, cast
one vote for each of five candidates, or could support an intermediate
number of candidates. If enough voters cast multiple votes for a candidate
they intensely supported, a candidate without majority support could
win.' 4 Thus, cumulative voting increases minority representation (like
single-member districting) but never requires racial gerrymandering (unlike
single-member districting).
Although some local governments have settled voting rights suits by
adopting cumulative voting, 5 courts and commentators who have discussed
cumulative voting have not explained exactly when cumulative voting is
preferable to single-member districting. This article addresses that question
and concludes that cumulative voting is most appropriate in small towns,
nonpartisan elections, and jurisdictions in which voters know whether
they are in the majority. By contrast, single-member districts are preferable
to cumulative voting in big cities, state or federal elections, partisan

9. Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 471.
10. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 120 (describing unusually shaped districts created in order to
comply with Section 2, such as one congressional district shaped like an earmuff in order to connect
two noncontiguous Hispanic neighborhoods in Chicago).
11, See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (finding that race-conscious districting may violate
Equal Protection Clause if districting plan lacks nonracial justification).
12. Guinier, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, was nominated by
President Clinton 1994 to head the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, which enforces the
Voting Rights Act. However, Clinton later withdrew the nomination because some of Guinier's
ideas were quite controversial. See Stephen L. Carter, Foreword to LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY
OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, vii, vii-xii (1994) (describing conservatives' attacks on Guinier). See also GUINIER, supra note 5, at 14-15, 95-101 (endorsing
cumulative voting).
13. Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 477.
14. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 14-15.
15. See, e.g., Dillard v. Chilton County Board of Education, 699 F. Supp. 870 (M.D. Ala.
1988), aff'd without opinion, 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989) (approving one such settlement).
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elections, and elections in which the racial or partisan balance between
factions is either close or is unknown to most voters.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE RISE (AND POSSIBLE FALL) OF
SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS

The Growth of Majority Minority Districts Under the Voting
Rights Act
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act 16 in 1965 to restrict literacy
tests and other practices used by southern states to prevent blacks from
voting.17 After the act was enacted, Southern states frequently altered
election rules in order to reduce black candidates' chances of winning.
For example, some localities switched from single-member district elections
to at-large elections.' At-large elections typically allow a cohesive majority
bloc to elect all legislators. For example, suppose 51% of voters in City
X are white, 49% are black, and all whites vote for whites. Under an
at-large system, all white candidates will get at least 51% of the vote,
and 51076 of the voters will therefore win 100% of the seats. By contrast,
under a system of neighborhood-based districts, some districts will typically
be majority black, and the black minority will therefore obtain some
representation in the city council.' 9 In order to increase minority representation, voting rights activists have generally sought to replace atlarge elections with single-member districts .20
Initially, voting rights activists met with some resistance from the
Supreme Court, which held that districting plans were illegal only if they
were enacted with discriminatory intent. 2 ' In 1982, Congress overruled
the Supreme Court by enacting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which
provided that "dilution claims could be proved based on discriminatory
results alone." '2 2 However, the lack of proportional representation alone
does not violate Section 2.23 In 1986, the Supreme Court held that to
establish that an at-large or multimember districting plan violates Section
2, plaintiffs must show that (1) a racial minority is sufficiently numerous
and compact to constitute a majority of the voters in a single-member
district, 24 (2) the minority group is politically cohesive, 25 and (3) the
majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat

A.

16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. V 1993).
17. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 7.
18. Id. As at-large voting and multimember districting have the same effects, see supra note 4,
the term "at-large election" should be read to include multimember districting within a larger
jurisdiction throughout this article.
19. Id. at 7-8.
20. Id. at 150.
21. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
22. GUINIaR, supra note 5, at 50.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (Supp. V 1993).
24. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
25. Id. at 51.
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the minority's preferred candidate." 26 If these factors have been established, courts must also "examine other evidence in the totality of the
27
circumstances" before finding a voting rights violation.
Over the past decade, Section 2 has revolutionized electoral laws in
areas with large minority populations. Many state and local governments
have remedied Section 2 violations by abolishing multimember and atlarge systems and replacing them with single-member districting, thereby
2
ensuring that minorities could elect at least one municipal legislator.
Even states which already used single-member districts were forced to
redraw them in order to create a larger number of majority minority
districts. 29 However, the growth of race-conscious single-member districting
has created a variety of unintended consequences.
B.

Has the Voting Rights Revolution Gone Sour?
Undoubtedly, Section 2 has increased representation of racial minorities.
Between 1985 and 1992, the number of black elected officials rose by
almost 20%30 and the number of Hispanic elected officials rose by over
50o0.11 Nevertheless, single-member districting has been criticized on several grounds.
First, despite the aforementioned statistics, single-member districts do
not always increase minority representation. Where a minority is segregated
into a few neighborhoods, single-member districting usually increases
minority representation by allowing the creation of majority minority
districts.12 However, single-member districting will not increase minority
representation where a racial group is "too geographically dispersed for
a districting plan to result in many, if any, 'majority minority' districts. ' 33

26. Id. (citations omitted). The Court later held that the same test applied to suits challenging
single-member districting plans. See Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993).
27. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994). Such evidence may include evidence
of historical discrimination against a minority group, the exclusion of minority group members from
candidate slating processes, the use of voting practices that make discrimination easier (such as
unusually large election districts), economic and social inequalities between racial groups, the use
of racial appeals in political campaigns, responsiveness of elected officials to the minority's needs,
and the policy supporting the government's use of the challenged electoral practice. Id. at 2656
n.9. In addition, proportional representation of minority groups (or the absence thereof) is highly
relevant. Id. at 2660-61 (noting that proportional representation important but not always dispositive).
28. See Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 471. See also League of United Latin Citizens v.
Midland Indep. School Dist., 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987) (requiring switch from at-large elections
to single-member districts).
29. See, e.g. Rural West Tennessee African-American Council, Inc. v. McWherter, 836 F. Supp.
453 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (rejecting state Senate redistricting plan where only 9.1% of single-member
districts majority black, state could have enacted plan in which 12.1% of districts majority black,
and 14.4% of voting-age population was black).
30. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1993 at 280 (113th ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABSTRACT] (noting increase from 6312
black elected officials to 7517).
31. Id. at 281 (noting increase from 3147 Hispanic elected officials to 4994).
32. Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 471.
33. Id.
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single-member disSuch "dispersed minorities" are no better off 3under
4
tricting than under traditional at-large systems.
Second, race-conscious districting is constitutionally questionable. Long
before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court held
that racially motivated redistricting is unconstitutional if district-drawers
intended to "[single] out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority
for special discriminatory treatment." 3 5 In Shaw v. Reno,3 6 the Court
expanded its prohibition of racial gerrymandering to restrict race-conscious
redistricting plans enacted in order to comply with Section 2. In Shaw,
the plaintiffs challenged North Carolina's congressional redistricting plan,
which created numerous "unusually shaped" districts in order to increase
the number of majority black districts.37 For example, one district "narrowly track[ed] the path of an interstate, creating a swatch of voters on
either side of the highway from one end of the state to the other." 3 8
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection claim because the
plan was enacted to comply with the Voting Rights Act and did not
cause underrepresentation of white voters.3 9 The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for further proceedings, holding that plaintiffs could chal-4
lenge the state's redistricting plan under the Equal Protection Clause 0
if the plan was "so irrational on its face that it can be understood only
as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of
their race ' 4 1 and was not "narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest." ' 42 Unfortunately, the practical impact of Shaw is
unclear because the Court did not explain either (1) what constituted a
"rational" justification for a districting plan or (2) what constituted a
''compelling governmental interest."
Third, racial gerrymandering is arguably objectionable on policy grounds.
For example, the Shaw Court expressed concern that "[riacial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society ' 43 by
reinforcing "the belief, held by too many for too much of our history,
that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin."" The Court
added that "[riacial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions . . . [and] carry us further

34. Even if dispersed minorities had a remedy for section 2 violations, they frequently cannot
even prove a section 2 violation because the Supreme Court has held that to do so, a minority
must be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (emphasis added).
35. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960) (invalidating plan redrawing a city's
boundaries to exclude blacks). See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971) (applying
similar principles to redistricting within state).
36. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
37. Id.at 2820.
38. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 120.
39. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (citation omitted).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from denying equal protection of the laws).
41. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
42. Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters." 4 5
Fourth, single-member districting, regardless of its racial impact, has
two significant disadvantages. Initially, single-member districting "wastes"
votes (i.e. renders them insignificant). Single-member districting wastes
the votes of losing candidates' supporters by ensuring that they are not
represented by a candidate for whom they voted. 46 Single-member districting also wastes the votes of winning candidates' supporters. As the
Supreme Court noted in Shaw, "[w]hen more people vote for the winning
candidate than is necessary to carry the district, their votes are technically
wasted because they were unnecessary to provide an electoral margin
within the district and because they could have been used to provide the
47
necessary electoral margin for a like-minded partisan in another district."
Additionally, single-member districting leads to gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is the "distortion of district boundaries and populations for
partisan or political purposes. ' 48 Where there are no districts there are
no district boundaries, and gerrymandering is therefore impossible. Gerrymandering reduces political competition, because in order to create
"safe" seats for their own allies, district-drawers must create a large
number of noncompetitive districts. By reducing political competition,
gerrymandering may also reduce voter interest and turnout. 49 In addition,
gerrymandering may have the pernicious consequences of (1) allowing
politicians to "re-elect" themselves by manipulating district boundaries, 0
(2) allowing parties to obtain majorities through adroit districting even
if they only have a minority of the popular vote," and (3) allowing a
2
majority party to turn a small majority into an overwhelming majority.
In sum, single-member districts have increased minority representation,
but arguably have undesirable side effects. As a result, some commentators
have endorsed alternative systems such as cumulative voting.

45. Id. The above discussion is not an exhaustive summary of the policy arguments against race
conscious districting. Other arguments against race-conscious districting include contentions that: (1)
because the right to vote is individual in nature, redistricting need not consider group interests
(GUINIER, supra note 5, at 139), (2) minorities can be adequately represented even if there are no
majority minority districts, because they can form multiracial coalitions in majority white districts
(see id. at 35-36), and (3) geography is a more legitimate basis for districting than race, because
voters choose where they live (see id. at 141). But see id. at 36-37, 65-66, 124-42 (rebutting arguments
against race-conscious districting).
46. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 134-35. For example, single-member districting wastes the votes
of Democrats in Republican districts, or blacks in majority white districts.
47. Id. at 134.
48. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). District-drawers
construct gerrymanders in two ways: (l)"packing" political opponents into a small number of
districts to diminish their overall influence, and (2)"cracking" the opposition vote by spreading it
among a number of districts so that the opposition cannot obtain a majority in any district. See
Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REv. 403, 406 (1994) (citations
omitted).
49. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 85.
50. See id.
51. Lewyn, supra note 48, at 407.
52. Id. But see id. at 407-09 (addressing and rebutting arguments that gerrymandering is (1) not
an unmitigated evil or (2) rarely successful).

CUMULATIVE VOTING

Winter 1995]

III.

THE STORY OF CUMULATIVE VOTING

Traditional at-large elections and single-member districting are not the
only possible districting systems. A city or state may also use modified
at-large systems such as cumulative voting, which include safeguards to
increase minority representation (unlike traditional at-large elections) but
eliminate gerrymandering (unlike single-member districting). 3 The following sections of this article discuss (1) how cumulative voting works and
(2) the history of cumulative voting.
A.

What Is Cumulative Voting?
Cumulative voting is a type of at-large districting, because (as in any
other at-large system) voters vote for multiple candidates to represent a
jurisdiction or multimember district. However, in jurisdictions using cumulative voting (unlike those using traditional at-large systems) "voters
are not restricted to casting only a single vote for any particular candidate,
but may instead cumulate'5 4 or aggregate their votes behind one or more
candidates if they wish."
For example, a voter with three votes to cast may "vote in the traditional
fashion, casting one vote each for three different candidates, or may
cast two votes for one candidate and one for another, or even cast all
three of his votes for a single candidate (a phenomenon called
'plumping')."" Thus, cumulative voting allows minorities to elect candidates by plumping for them, despite the majority's apathy or 5 hostility.
6
As in at-large voting, the candidates with the most votes win.
The number of votes necessary to elect a candidate under cumulative
voting is determined by a concept known as the "threshold of exclusion."
The threshold of exclusion is the fraction of the "electorate that a group
must exceed in order to elect the candidate of its choice, regardless of

53. I note in passing that cumulative voting is not the only modified at-large system in existence.
Other such systems include:
1. Pure proportional representation, a system "under which political parties must be represented
in a legislature in proportion to their statewide vote totals." Lewyn, supra note 48, at 405. Cf.
John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of ProportionalRepresentation, 94 YALE L.J.
163 (1984).
2. The single transferable vote allows voters to number all candidates in the order of preference
from most favorite to least favorite. Once a voter's first choice has accumulated the minimum
number of votes necessary for election, her surplus votes may be transferred to the voter's second
choice (or lower choices, if the second choice has also accumulated the minimum number of votes
necessary for election). See Lewyn, supra note 48, at 484; Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R.
(Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U.PA.
L. REV. 1991 (1993) (endorsing system).
3. Limited voting allows voters to cast fewer votes than there are seats available. Therefore, a
majority of the electorate cannot elect every single legislator. See Pamela Karlan, Maps and
Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 223-24 (1989); Engstrom, supra note 2, at 475 n.32.
The advantages and disadvantages of these systems are beyond the scope of this article; the
purpose of this article is merely to discuss cumulative voting in depth, and to compare it to singlemember districting.
54. Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 477.
55. Id.
56. id
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how the rest of the electorate votes."" 7 In cumulative voting systems the
threshold of exclusion is usually one divided by one plus the number of
seats at stake. 8 For example, where three seats are at stake, any candidate
with over one-fourth of the vote will win.5 9 This concept can be illustrated
by the following hypothetical: suppose the city of Engstromville has 3
council seats, 4 candidates (whites B, C, and D, and black E), and 10
voters (7 whites and 3 blacks, all of whom vote only for candidates of
their own race). Under traditional at-large elections, voters can cast only
one vote per candidate, so B, C and D will each beat E by a 7-3 margin.
By contrast, under cumulative voting, the black voters can "plump" for
the black, giving him a total of 9 votes (3 for each black voter). If the
white vote is equally divided among the candidates, E finishes first (with
9 votes, as opposed to 7 for each of the whites).
If opposition votes are not evenly divided among candidates, a candidate
can win under cumulative voting with less than the threshold of exclusion,
because the less successful opposition candidates will also fall below the
threshold. For example, suppose that in Guinier County (which also uses
cumulative voting), there are 8 whites and 2 blacks, 3 white candidates
(A, B and C), I black candidate (D), and 3 council seats at stake.
Because the threshold of exclusion is 250, a black candidate will lose
if the white vote is evenly split among all white candidates. Nevertheless,
if 5 white voters cast all their votes for A, 2 give one vote to each of
3 white candidates (A, B and C), and 1 casts all her votes for B, the
black candidate will still finish in the top three. A will have finished
first with 17 votes, the black candidate (D) will be in second place with
6 votes (due to plumping by both black voters) and B and C will have
only 5 and 2 votes respectively. Indeed, in Illinois (which used cumulative
voting for elections in three-seat state House districts) candidates were
6 one-fourth of the
sometimes elected with as little as 6.407o of the vote,w
threshold of exclusion.
In sum, cumulative voting combines at-large elections with minority
representation by allowing minorities to show the intensity of their support
for their favorite candidates. Nevertheless, cumulative voting rarely turns
minorities into majorities, because by plumping for one candidate, minority groups forego the opportunity to elect others. 6'
B.

The Checkered Past of Cumulative Voting

1. The First Wave of Support and the Illinois Experiment
As early as 1859, commentators have endorsed cumulative voting on
the ground that it "protect[s] minority party representation while dis-

57. Id. at 478 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 479.
59. Id. at 478.
60. Charles W. Dunn, Cumulative Voting Problems in Illinois Legislative Elections, 9 HARVARD
J. ON LEGIS. 627, 651 (1972).
61. But see infra text accompanying notes 180-188 (suggesting that where electorate closely divided
between races or parties, strategic voting might turn majority into minority and vice versa).
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couraging the proliferation of minor parties that might occur under
proportional representation. ' 62 During the late 19th century, cumulative
voting was proposed in various jurisdictions, although it was rarely
adopted. 63 America's only long-term 64 cumulative voting experiment was
Illinois' use of cumulative voting in state House elections.
In 1870, the Illinois constitutional convention adopted cumulative voting
for the Illinois House. 65 The convention adopted cumulative voting for
three reasons. First, the convention wanted to increase minority representation in order to make the House more representative of the electorate. 66 Second, the convention wanted to allow individual voters to
maximize their influence by plumping for their first choice. 67 Third, the
convention intended to eliminate sectional divisions between the parties
by ensuring that some Republicans would represent southern Illinois (then
would represent northern
dominated by Democrats) while some Democrats
68
Illinois (then dominated by Republicans).
Under Illinois' cumulative voting system, the state had fifty-nine House
districts, each of which had three seats, 69 and voters could distribute
their votes between candidates in at least three ways: they could cast
one vote for each of three candidates, one and one-half votes for each
of two candidates, or three votes for one candidate. 70 Because nearly

62. Dunn, supra note 60, at 629. Ironically, Guinier endorses cumulative voting precisely because
single-member districting unduly restricts the growth of third parties. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 86.
However, the Illinois experience suggests that under cumulative voting, the threshold of exclusion
is too high for most minor parties. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 633-34 (noting weakness of minor
parties under cumulative voting).
63. In 1873, the governor of New York vetoed a New York City charter providing for cumulative
voting, and in 1891, South Dakota voters rejected cumulative voting in a referendum. Dunn, supra
note 60, at 630. Cumulative voting bills were also introduced in the U.S. Congress in 1869, 1870
and 1871, but were not seriously considered. Id.
64. In the early 1870s Pennsylvania and Wilmington, North Carolina briefly adopted cumulative
voting for municipal elections, but both jurisdictions quickly repealed the system. Id. at 629-30. In
addition, corporations frequently use cumulative voting to elect directors. See Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Institutions as Institutional Investors: A New Look At Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124,
145-46 (1994) (noting that six states require cumulative voting, and forty-three others permit it). I
doubt that corporate cumulative voting is particularly relevant to politics because the major arguments
against corporate cumulative voting are simply inapplicable to any sort of legislative elections. For
example, opponents of corporate cumulative voting argue that cumulative voting can turn a corporate
board of directors into a "debating forum," id. at 167, in which directors are "partisans of particular
interest groups." Id. In contrast, a legislature should be a "debating forum" in which a variety
of views are represented. But cf. Karlan, supra note 53, at 232-33 n.249 (noting that purpose of
corporate cumulative voting, like purpose of legislative cumulative voting, is to increase minority
representation).
65. Dunn, supra note 60, at 630-31.
66. Id. at 631-32.
67. Id. at 632.
68. Id. at 630. Ironically, this rationale for cumulative voting is arguably no longer valid, at
least not in Illinois. In recent years, both Northern and Southern Illinois have elected representatives
of both parties. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
1994 at 381, 389-435 (1994) (comparison of state map with legislator profiles show that in recent
years downstate Illinois has elected U.S. representatives of both parties, as has the Chicago area)
[hereinafter ALMANAC].
69. Dunn, supra note 60, at 631.
70. Id. at 657. However, Illinois law was apparently unclear as to whether voters could cast
two votes for one candidate and one for a third. Id. at 656.
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every district gave one of its three seats to a candidate from the minority
party, 7' the Illinois system achieved two of its goals: (1) reducing geographic divisions between the73 parties7 2 and (2) increasing minority party
representation in the House.

However, cumulative voting arguably failed to increase the individual
voter's influence, because "[t]he majority party in a district would often
nominate two candidates, and the minority party just one." ' 74 Parties
failed to run full slates because of (1) "fear that their votes [would] be
diluted to the point that they will lose a seat which they [could] easily
win [if they ran fewer candidates] 75 ' and (2) collusion between party
organizations. 76 As a result of the parties' strategies, cumulative voting
arguably weakened voter power by weakening political competition. To
solve this problem, the 1920-22 Illinois constitutional convention proposed
a constitution which abolished cumulative voting. In 1922, the proposed
constitution (which was submitted to the voters as a whole, so that voters
77
could not separately decide the cumulative voting issue) was defeated.
In 1970, another constitutional convention altered the cumulative voting
system by providing that party committees could no longer limit nominations to less than two in each district (thereby eliminating elections
in which all major-party nominees were unopposed).7" Because a large
minority of the convention opposed cumulative voting, a proposal to
abolish cumulative voting in favor of single-member districting was submitted to the voters separately from the constitution as a whole, and
79
was narrowly defeated.

In 1980, Illinois finally abolished cumulative voting when "Illinois
voters, upset over a substantial pay raise that legislators had granted
themselves, voted to reduce the number of seats in [the Illinois House]." 80
Voters' support of the amendment "was reportedly an expression of
disaffection with the sitting legislature and had little or nothing to do
with support/opposition to cumulative voting." 8'
71. Id. at 633. See also Karlan, supra note 53, at 233 n.250 (noting that Illinois system achieved
similar results in 20th century when Democrats became dominant party in Chicago while Republicans
became dominant party downstate).
72. Dunn, supra note 60, at 632.
73. Id. at 633.
74. Id. at 635.
75. Charles W. Wiggins & Janice Petty, Cumulative Voting and Electoral Competition, 7 AM.
POL. Q. 345, 355 (1979). This fear is by no means irrational. For example, suppose that the 1st
House district has 55 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and that every voter splits her votes equally
among the candidates of her party. If the Democrats run 3 candidates to the Republicans' 2, each
Democrat gets only 55 votes (one per candidate) while each Republican gets 67.5 (1.5 per candidate).
Thus, if the Democrats ran "too many" candidates, the Republicans would win 2 of 3 seats despite
being the minority party.
76. Id.
77. Dunn, supra note 60, at 636. 1 note in passing that in 1910, the legislature altered cumulative
voting by applying it to primaries. Id. at 636 n.43.
78. Id. at 661-62.
79. Id. at 637 (noting that proposal for single-member districts carried 76 of 102 counties, but
lost due to heavy opposition from Chicago area).
80. Engstrom et. al, supra note 2, at 476 n.38.
81. Richard L. Engstrom & Charles J. Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumulative Voting:
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 Soc. Sm. Q. 388, 388 n.1 (1991) (citation omitted).
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2. The Revival of Cumulative Voting
Ironically, shortly after Illinois abolished cumulative voting, it regained
its popularity among commentators, albeit for entirely different reasons.
In recent years, several commentators have endorsed cumulative voting
as a means of increasing the representation of racial (as opposed to
partisan) minorities.12 Several jurisdictions have adopted cumulative voting
plans in order to settle voting rights lawsuits.
For example, in the Dillard v. Chilton County Board of Education3
litigation, five jurisdictions-three municipalities, a county commission,
and a county school board-voluntarily adopted cumulative voting in
order to settle a voting rights lawsuit. In each of these jurisdictions, the
black population was either too small or too dispersed for district drawers
to create a "majority minority" district. 84 Nevertheless, in the first election
held under cumulative voting, all five jurisdictions elected black candidates.8 5 Moreover, the election results suggest that "black electoral success
was due in substantial part to the ability of black voters to concentrate
their support behind a few candidates: all four of the successful black
'8 6
candidates ... received more votes than there were black [voters].
Moreover, cumulative voting in Alabama helped political as well as
racial minorities. Under Chilton County's traditional at-large system, the
county's school board and commission were monopolized by white Demwhite Democrats, three
ocrats. By contrast, each body now has three
7
white Republicans, and one black Democrat.1
Similarly, Alamogordo, New Mexico, settled a voting rights suit by
agreeing to adopt cumulative voting for three at-large city council seats."8
Between 1970 and the 1986 settlement, no Hispanic candidate had been
elected to the council, although 2170 of the city's voting age population
was Hispanic. 89 In the first election held under cumulative voting, a
Hispanic was elected. The minority candidate's success was apparently
due to plumping, because an exit poll showed that fewer voters supported
the Hispanic candidate than supported the fourth-place white candidate.
Nevertheless, the Hispanic candidate won because 52.97o of her supporters
gave her multiple votes (as opposed to 27.4% of the fourth-place candidate's supporters). 9°

82. See infra notes 102-34 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of cumulative voting).
83. 699 F. Supp. 870 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (approving settlement adopting cumulative voting for
county board of education and county commission), aff'd without opinion, 868 F.2d 1274 (11th
Cir. 1989); see also id. at 876 n.7 (citing unreported cases approving settlements for three small
municipalities) (citations omitted).
84. Karlan, supra note 53, at 234. 1 note in passing that before the settlement all five jurisdictions
used at-large systems. Dillard, 699 F. Supp. at 872.
85. Karlan, supra note 53, at 234.
86. Id. at 235.
87. GuINIER, supra note 5, at 15-16. Because each body has seven members, the threshold of
exclusion is one-eighth, or 12.5%. Id. at 15.
88. Vega v. City of Alamogordo, No. 86-0051-C (D.N.M. Feb. 10, 1986). Four other council
members are elected through at-large districts. Engstrom et. al, supra note 2, at 480-81.
89. Engstrom et. al, supra note 2, at 481.
90. Id. at 491.
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Cumulative voting also increased minority representation in elections
for the Sisseton-Wahpeton School Board in South Dakota. The school
district (which is one-third Native American) is governed by a ninemember school board elected at-large. Each year, three of the nine
members are elected to three-year terms. 9 1 Although Native American
candidates had occasionally run for the school board, they usually could
not win without substantial white support. 92 In order to settle a voting
rights suit brought by Native American voters, the district enacted cumulative voting.9 3 In the first election held under cumulative voting, a
Native American finished first among seven candidates and therefore won
a seat. 94 The Native American finished fourth among whites, 95 but was
96
elected because over 90% of Native American voters plumped for him.
IV.

WHEN IS CUMULATIVE VOTING APPROPRIATE?

In order to determine when cumulative voting is appropriate, it is
necessary to consider a number of factors. These factors include the
following: (1) who decides when cumulative voting systems may be created,
(2) the advantages of cumulative voting over single-member districting,
and how those advantages may be maximized, and (3) the alleged disadvantages of cumulative voting and how these disadvantages may be
minimized.
A.

Who Decides and When?
Nearly every jurisdiction that has adopted cumulative voting in recent
years has done so as part of a voluntary settlement of a voting rights
suit. 97 Thus, the pros and cons of cumulative voting are most relevant

to legislators and attorneys who are deciding whether to (1) settle voting
rights suits by enacting single-member districting plans, (2) settle such
suits by enacting cumulative voting plans, or (3) go to trial.
By contrast, judges have a limited role in deciding what remedy is
appropriate. Where the parties have reached a voting rights settlement,
the court must approve it if it provides minority voters with a "realistic
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice" 98 and "represents a fair

91. Engstrom & Barrilleaux, supra note 81, at 389.
92. Id. According to plaintiffs, Native Americans had won only when (1) they were "handpicked"
by white board members, and therefore were not the minority's choice, or (2) the whites decided
to run only two candidates for three seats, thereby guaranteeing election to a Native American
candidate. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 390.
95. Id.
96. According to an exit poll, 339 of 358 votes cast by 121 Native Americans were for the
Native American candidate. Id. at 390-91. Thus, at least 113 of the 121 Native American voters
voted for their group's candidate, and the average Native American gave the Native American
candidate 2.8 votes. See id. at 390.
97. Id. at 388. Apparently, at least eight jurisdictions have adopted cumulative voting in settlements. Id. at 388 n.2 (listing jurisdictions).
98. Dillard, 699 F. Supp. at 875.
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and equitable solution to this litigation." 99 Where the parties have not
agreed on an appropriate remedy, the court must adopt the legislature's
proposed remedy unless it is "legally unacceptable because it . . . fails
to meet the same standards applicable to an original [voting rights]
challenge of a legislative plan in place."' 1 However, where a legislative
body fails to present the district court with an acceptable remedy, the
district 0 court may "exercise its discretion in fashioning a 'near optimal'
plan."'
In sum, parties must consider the advantages and disadvantages of
cumulative voting in deciding upon settlement terms, and courts must
do so in deciding (1) whether to approve a settlement or (2) what to do
if no acceptable remedy has been proposed.
The Advantages of Cumulative Voting
Supporters of cumulative voting argue that cumulative voting (1) increases minority representation in situations where single-member districting does not, (2) reduces the number of votes "wasted" on losing
candidates, (3) eliminates gerrymandering of all types, (4) encourages02
voters to build multiracial coalitions, and (5) may increase voter turnout. 1
Each of these arguments will be discussed below.
B.

1. Cumulative Voting and "Dispersed Minorities"
Where a racial minority is geographically concentrated, district-drawers
can easily give that minority proportional representation by creating
majority-minority districts. 103 However, single-member districts are far less
satisfactory where a politically cohesive minority group is too geographically dispersed for a single-member districting plan to create majority
minority districts. For example, suppose that a Hispanic family lives in
every other house in Dunntown, and constitutes 40% of that city's

99. Id. at 876 n.6.
100. McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Applying
this rule, the court held that a "limited voting" plan could not be imposed where the legislature
presented the court with a remedial single-member districting plan "which provides the maximum
opportunity for representation possible by that means." Id. at 120. Thus, it appears that a court
may not impose cumulative voting upon an unwilling legislature merely because minorities cannot
elect a representative under a single-member plan.
101. Id.at 115.
102. Pre-Voting Rights Act commentators made two other arguments in favor of cumulative
voting, both of which are now questionable. First, it was argued that "the longer legislative tenure
resulting from the cumulative voting system makes the Illinois House of Representatives a more
experienced legislative body." Dunn, supra note 60, at 639. Today, incumbents are usually reelected
even in single-member districts. See, e.g. ABSTRACT supra note 30, at 277 (showing that in most
recent elections, over 90% of U.S. representatives reelected). As a result, incumbency protection is
frequently considered a disadvantage for an electoral system rather than an advantage. See BARONE
& UJIFUSA, supra note 68, at 214, 292 (describing efforts to limit state and federal legislators'
tenure). Second, pre-Voting Rights Act commentators noted that cumulative voting gives each party
representation in the other's strongest districts. However, it is not altogether clear why a legislature
should include legislators who represent minuscule factions merely to give each party representation
in all areas. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 651 (noting that in Illinois, legislators elected with as
little as 6.4% of the vote).
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2658 n.11 (1994).
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population. In the absence of unusually creative districting, every possible
district in Dunntown would be about 40o Hispanic, and Hispanics would
therefore be outvoted everywhere. Thus, single-member districting will
frequently underrepresent such "dispersed minorities."'°4
By contrast, under cumulative voting, "dispersed minorities" can elect
representatives of their choice by plumping for their favorite candidate.
For example, if city A has cumulative voting for three at-large council
positions, Hispanics can easily elect a council member (because the threshold of exclusion will be only 25%, far below the city's Hispanic percentage).1 05
The Chilton County, Alabama, elections support the "dispersed minority" argument. In Chilton County, the black population was only
slightly below the threshold of exclusion.'0° Nevertheless, it was not
"possible to draw a single-member district plan which would provide
black voters with an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates." 7 Under cumulative voting, however, blacks managed to elect
candidates by plumping for their favorites. 08 Similarly, in Alamogordo,
New Mexico, a single-member districting plan would, at best, have given
minorities a solid majority in one of seven single-member districts and
only a "tenuous"' 9 majority in another, even though blacks and Hispanics
together constituted 29.3°0o of the city's population. 10 Thus, single-member
districting would have given minorities some representation, but might
not have given them proportional representation. By contrast, after the
first election held under cumulative voting, two of seven council members
were members of racial minority groups: a black who had been elected
from a majority minority district, and a Hispanic elected through cumulative voting."' It therefore appears that cumulative voting solves the
"dispersed minority" problem by allowing minority groups to elect the
candidates of their choice even where those groups are not geographically
concentrated enough to form a majority in a single-member district.
2. Cumulative Voting and Wasted Votes
Under single-member districting, a minority of voters arguably "waste"
their votes by casting them for losing candidates." 2 In a single-member

104. 1 note, however, that single-member districting in city A would not violate the Voting Rights
Act. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (districting plan is not illegal if no minority group
"geographically compact" enough to constitute majority in single-member district). Thus, the "dispersed minority" argument for cumulative voting is more relevant to settlement negotiations than
to judicial proceedings.
105. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (explaining threshold of exclusion).
106. In Chilton County, most legislative bodies had seven members. See Karlan, supra note 53,
at 234 n.253. Thus, the threshold of exclusion was 12.507o. The black population of Chilton County
was 11.86%, and was 10-11% in two of the Chilton County cities which adopted cumulative voting.
Id. at 235 n.255.
107. Id. at 234.
108. Id. at 234-35.
109. Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 482.
110. Id. at 481.
Ill. Id. at 489 (noting that Hispanic elected because Hispanic voters "seiz[ed] the opportunity
to cumulate their votes on her behalf.").
112. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 134.
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district, a candidate may need as much as 50% of the vote (plus one)
to be elected. In a close election nearly half the vote is wasted on losing
candidates." 3 By lowering the threshold of exclusion, cumulative voting
ensures that a candidate who gets a large minority of the vote will be
elected, and that his votes will not have been wasted on a loser. Thus,
voting reduces the number of votes wasted
it appears that cumulative
14
on losing candidates."
3. The End of Gerrymandering
Another advantage of cumulative voting is that by eliminating redistricting, it eliminates gerrymandering." 5 Gerrymandering is constitutionally
questionable (and is arguably bad public policy)" 6 whether it is done for
racial 17 or partisan"' reasons.
However, cumulative voting will only eliminate redistricting under certain circumstances. In elections for small legislative bodies, such as municipal elections for small cities, cumulative voting will usually eliminate
redistricting because where only five or ten seats are at stake, at-large
voting is feasible.
By contrast, even some supporters of cumulative voting admit that in
big cities or state legislative elections "some multimember subdistricts
would be required both to reduce the complexity of the ballot and to
promote access for local communities of interest. In New York City, for
example, boroughs might be appropriate multimember districts for borough-wide cumulative voting."" 9 This is so because in elections for large
legislative bodies, cumulative voting without any districting might confuse
voters. For example, the smallest state House in the United States, that
of Alaska, has thirty-eight members. 20 If Alaska used cumulative voting
without creating any districts, voters would be forced to choose among
at least seventy-six candidates (one from each major party) for thirty-

113. Of course,. even more votes may be wasted in a multicandidate race where a candidate can
win with a mere plurality of the vote.
114. On the other hand, by decreasing the number of votes wasted on losers, cumulative voting
increases the number of votes wasted on winning candidates. See GUINIaR, supra note 5, at 134
(noting that "[w]hen more people vote for the winning candidate than is technically necessary to
carry the district, their votes are technically wasted because they are unnecessary to provide an
electoral margin."). For example, in a South Dikota school board election held under cumulative
voting, Native American voters wasted so many votes for Native American candidate that "had
[his] vote been split almost equally between [him] and another Native American candidate, both
could have been elected." Engstrom & Barrilleaux, supra note 81, at 391. However, this kind of
vote wasting is far less undesirable, because a voter who casts an unnecessary vote for a winning
candidate knows she is represented by someone she has voted for, unlike the voter who wastes her
vote on a losing candidate.
115. See GUINIER, supra note 5, at 152.
116. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
117. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (racial gerrymandering without adequate justification
unconstitutional even if purpose is to benefit minorities).
118. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion) (partisan gerrymandering
unconstitutional if minority party's strength consistently degraded).
119. See GUINIER, supra note 5, at 154-55.
120. ABSTRACT, supra note 30, at 279.
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eight seats, and would have to decide how to cumulate thirty-eight votes
among those candidates-obviously an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. As numerous cities are more populous than Alaska,' 2 ' cu-

mulative voting would also require redistricting in big-city municipal
elections.
If redistricting makes gerrymandering possible, and cumulative voting
would not eliminate redistricting in big-city, state, or congressional elections, it follows that cumulative voting would not eliminate gerrymandering in such elections. On the other hand, cumulative voting would
eliminate gerrymandering in municipal elections for small and mid-sized
cities.
4. Cumulative Voting and Multiracial Coalitions
In single-member districts drawn in order to increase minority representation, voters are often packed into districts dominated by one race.
As a result, race-conscious districting systematically wastes both the votes
of voters who are not part of the racial majority in their district (e.g.,
whites in black districts, blacks in white districts), and the votes of voters
who are in the minority within their race (e.g., white liberals in white
Republican districts, black conservatives in black Democratic districts).1 22
By contrast, cumulative voting allows voters to form "voluntary districts"
by joining across district lines and forming multiracial coalitions. For
example, black liberal voters whose votes are not needed for the election
of a black candidate may ally with sympathetic white liberals in another
part of a city (or state) to elect a like-minded candidate. 23
Similarly, in Alamogordo, New Mexico, a Hispanic candidate won
primarily because a majority of Hispanic individuals voted for her, 24 but
she could not have been elected without significant white "crossover"
support. 125 Thus, it appears that cumulative voting can encourage multiracial coalitions.
5. Cumulative Voting and Voter Turnout
It has also been suggested that cumulative voting might raise voter
turnout, for a variety of reasons. First, if cumulative voting reduces the
number of "safe districts" by eliminating gerrymandering, elections might
become more competitive and voter interest would increase. 26 Second,
cumulative voting, by reducing the threshold of exclusion, would reduce

121. Id. at 42-44.
122. See GUINIER, supra note 5, at 85.
123. Id. at 96.
124. Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 495.
125. Id. at 493. The Hispanic candidate received a majority of the Hispanic vote, id. at 495,
and 21.8076 of the white vote. Id. at 493. Ironically, the Hispanic candidate ran not as a liberal
but as "a conservative candidate who will not vote for higher taxes." Id. at 486 (quoting campaign
literature).
126. See GUINIER supra note 5, at 85 (noting that "safe seats discourage political competition
and thus further diminish turnout.").
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the number of votes wasted on losing candidates. Ostensibly, this would
result in increasing a voter's chance of "making a difference" by voting
for a successful candidate. 27 Third, cumulative voting would require
groups to vote in large numbers in order to elect a representative. 28 For
example, suppose city X has 120 white voters (all of whom vote only
for whites) and 30 Hispanic voters. If the city has five single-member
council districts and creates a 90% Hispanic district, a Hispanic candidate
could win that district even if only 4 Hispanics voted because only 3
whites would live in the district. By contrast, under cumulative voting
the threshold of exclusion would be one-sixth, 29 so at least 25 Hispanics
would have to vote in order to guarantee the election of a Hispanic. In
sum, cumulative voting (like single-member districting) increases minority
representation but (unlike single-member districting) does not create districts which are so "safe" for a racial group that political organization
is unnecessary.
Of course, it could be argued that to the extent cumulative voting
requires groups to turn out large numbers of voters to elect representatives,
cumulative voting somehow causes underrepresentation of racial groups
"with large numbers of non-citizens, age-ineligible citizens or people with
other conditions that disable them from voting." 30 For example, Hispanics
might be underrepresented under cumulative voting.' 31 However, this
argument should not discourage jurisdictions from adopting cumulative
voting for three reasons. First, the only experiment with cumulative voting
in a heavily Hispanic area, Alamogordo, New Mexico, actually increased
Hispanic representation. In Alamogordo, a Hispanic won the first election
held under cumulative voting, even though only 13.7% of voters were
Hispanic. 3 2 Second, if it encourages high voter turnout, cumulative voting
may also encourage get-out-the vote efforts and other organizational
As minors and noncitizens are allowed to engage in such
activity.'
organizational activity, they too may be more likely to participate in a
cumulative voting system than in a single-member districting system. Third,
single-member districting does little for nonvoters; while a single-member
district's "population base extends top-down representational access to
nonvoters, these constituents are stuck with whomever the majority of
district voters choose."'1 3 4 Thus, nonvoters are no worse off under cumulative voting than under single-member districting.

127. Cf. id. at 152.
128. See id. at 99 (noting that cumulative voting "depends on high voter turnout").
129. See Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 479 (if five council seats are available, threshold of
exclusion isone-sixth, or 16.7%).
130. GU1NIER, supra note 5, at 154.
131. Hispanics are less likely than other groups to be eligible to vote for two reasons. First,
Hispanics are more likely than other groups to be under 18. See ABSTRACT, supra note 30, at 2425 (containing 1995 projections of age distribution among various groups). Second, Hispanics are
more likely than white non-Hispanics or blacks to be noncitizens. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 154.
132. See Engstrom, supra note 2, at 493 (estimate based on exit poll results).
133. See GUINIER, supra note 5, at 155.
134. Id. at 154.
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C. Disadvantages of Cumulative Voting
Opponents of cumulative voting have advanced a number of arguments
against this voting method. These commentators contend that cumulative
voting may result in the following: (1) create fragmentation by giving
minority groups representation; (2) make legislatures unmanageable by
narrowing the gap between the major parties; (3) make legislatures too
large; (4) reduce political competition; and (5) distort election results by
making a political group's strength depend on its voting strategy, rather
than on the size of the group. Each of these arguments will be addressed
in turn.
1. Cumulative Voting and Political Fragmentation
One argument against cumulative voting is that by allowing small
minority groups to elect legislators, it might create a "proliferation of
political interest constituencies [which] might undermine consensus, exacerbate tension, and destabilize the political system."',31 Where voting
rights violations have been alleged, the purpose of any remedy (whether
it be cumulative voting, single-member districting, or some other system)
is to fragment the electorate-in particular, to fragment a system of
"monolithic white rule in substantially [minority] areas." 3 6 Furthermore,
a single-member districting system can fragment a legislature almost as
easily as cumulative voting, because the purpose of both remedies is to
increase minority representation by allowing racial minorities to elect their
preferred candidates.
Of course, it could be argued that cumulative voting may create other
forms of fragmentation, such as the replacement of the two-party system
with a multiparty system. 3 7 However, Illinois' experience suggests that
minority parties are unlikely to benefit from cumulative voting. Although
candidates in Illinois occasionally won with as little as 6.4q/ of the vote,' 38
cumulative voting rarely aided minority parties. 39
2. Cumulative Voting and Legislative majorities
Cumulative voting might also cause political fragmentation by reducing
the majority party's margin of victory, and thereby depriving the majority party of a meaningful working majority. For example, in Illinois
the majority party was underrepresented in the House (that is, it received
less than a proportional share of seats) in 13 of 18 elections between
1930 and 1970. 40 As a result, "[clonsistently narrow divisions in rep-

135. Id. at 153.*
136. Karlan, supra note 53, at 231.
137. Cf. GUINIER, supra note 5, at 100 (suggesting, with approval, that cumulative voting might
create "[s]trong minority political parties").
138. Dunn, supra note 60, at 651.
139. Id. at 633-34. For example, in 1906 the Prohibitionist, Social and Labor parties obtained
15% of the statewide vote for state representatives, but elected only three members of the state
House. Id.
140. Id. at 650.
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resentation between the two parties often mean[t] that power in the
House of Representatives flow[ed] to small factions and away from
party leadership .. . [thus] the power of small factions to thwart the
majority and weaken party leadership [was] enhanced.' 14' For example,
in 1961 Republicans had an 89-88 House majority, but Democrats elected
the Speaker of the House because three Republican legislators who were
''minority party beneficiaries of cumulative voting and holders of Cook
County Democratic organization patronage positions, absented themselves from the opening organizational session.' ' 42 Where no political
party has a working majority, the legislature cannot be held collectively
each party can plausibly blame the
accountable for its actions, and
43
problems.
state's
the
for
other
This argument assumes that a majority party is more powerful when
it has a large majority and less powerful in a narrowly divided legislature.
However, a party with a slim legislative margin may sometimes be more
unified because legislators may be under more pressure to "vote the
party line" and because the majority party's slim margin might be due
to a loss of seats in regions where both parties are ideologically similar.
In order to test both theories, Tables I and 2 compare the majority
party's proportion of U.S. House and Senate seats to its proportion
of victories on "partisan votes"-that is, votes pitting the majority of
one party against the majority of another party. Both tables show the
results of this comparison for one of every five years between 1968
and 1993.144

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. For example, after the early 1990s recession, Democrats blamed President Bush for the
recession, while Republicans blamed the Democratic Congress. See ALMANAC, supra note 68, at 558,
790-91 (noting that President Bush suffered politically due to recession, but suggesting that Democratic
Senate might be to blame).
144. See 49 Cong. Q. Almanac (Cong. Q., Inc.) 17-C (1993); 44 Cong. Q. Almanac (Cong. Q.
Inc.), 37-B (1988); 39 Cong. Q. Almanac (Cong. Q. Inc.) 28-C (1983); 34 Cong. Q. Almanac (Cong.
Q., Inc.) 30-C (1978); 29 Cong. Q. Almanac (Cong. Q., Inc.) 958 (1973); 24 Cong. Q. Almanac
(Cong. Q., Inc.) 852 (1968). See also ABSTRACT, supra note 30 at 275 (giving parties' congressional
seat totals for recent decades). Although the "raw numbers" for Tables 1 and 2 come from the
above sources, I have calculated the percentages (i.e. parties' percentage of seats and of partisan
vote victories) myself.
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TABLE 1
Majority party's percentage of seats and percentage of victories on partisan
votes, U.S. House, 1968-93:141
Year

Seat %

Victory 07o

1968

56

53

1973

55

61

1978

67

68

1983

62

77

1988

59

84

1993

59

84

TABLE 2
Majority party's percentage of seats and percentage of victories on partisan
votes, U.S. Senate, 1968-93:'4
Year

Seat %

Victory %

1968

64

62

1973

56

70

1978

61

82

1983

54

64

1988

55

73

1993

57

76

Tables 1 and 2 show that the Democrats have consistently become far
more united in both houses of Congress (and therefore more successful
as a governing party), even though their percentage of House seats has
fluctuated, and their percentage of Senate seats has sharply decreased.
Thus, it appears that the majority party's seat share only marginally, if
at all, affects its political cohesion.
Even if cumulative voting did decrease the majority party's legislative
effectiveness, this result may sometimes be desirable. I concede that if
the same party controls both the legislative and executive branches of
government, or if (as in many local governments) the executive is weak,

145. For all years listed, the Democrats have been the majority party. ABSTRACT, supra note 30,
at 275.
146. In 1983, the Republicans were the majority party in the Senate; for all other years listed,
the Democrats were the majority party. Id.
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the majority party should have an effective legislative majority, because
the majority party would thereby "run the government" and could be
held accountable for its failures. However, if one party controls the
legislative branch and the other controls the executive branch, a highly
partisan legislature may make a state or nation even more ungovernable
than it would otherwise be. For example, suppose that the Republicans
control Congress and the Democrats control the Presidency. If the Republicans vote in lockstep, the nation will become virtually ungovernable,
because the Democratic president cannot get any legislation passed and
will veto the Republican legislation. By contrast, if the Republicans are
fragmented, a Democratic president can govern effectively (and be plausibly held accountable for the status quo) by forming a "liberal coalition"
of Democrats and moderate Republicans .147
In sum, two conclusions may be divined. First, it appears that even
if cumulative voting did reduce the disparity between the legislative seat
shares of the two dominant parties, the majority party might be able to
assemble a coherent legislative majority. Second, even if the majority
party was unable to assemble a coherent legislative majority, the majority
party's weakness might make government more coherent if the executive
branch was dominated by the opposing party.
3. Is Cumulative Voting Too Complicated?
It might also be argued that cumulative voting is too complex for most
voters, especially "members of minority groups, who are often less familiar
with the voting process and tend to have less formal education."' 48 For
example, in Illinois, voters and election officials were often uncertain
and sometimes
about how many votes could be cast for a given candidate,
49
tried to apply cumulative voting to other offices.1
However, recent experiments with cumulative voting suggest that cumulative voting is easy for voters to understand. For example, in Alamogordo's first election under cumulative voting, the Hispanic candidate
won partially because her Hispanic supporters understood the new system
well enough to give her an average of 2.6 votes apiece (of a possible
3).11 ° Similarly, in Alabama local elections applying cumulative voting,
all successful black candidates received more votes than there were black
residents,' and two black candidates received more than twice as many
votes as there were black residents. 5 2 As voting in Chilton County was

147. Cf. Lewyn, supra note 48, at 483-84 (using similar argument to criticize pure proportional
representation systems, on the ground that such systems usually require all party legislators to be
chosen by party bureaucracy, thereby encouraging legislators to vote in lockstep and creating political
deadlock where legislative and executive branches controlled by opposing parties).
148. Note, Alternative Voting Systems As Remedies For Unlawful Vote Dilution, 92 YALE L.J.
144, 155 (1982).
149. See DAVID KENNEY, BASIC ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT: A SYSTEMATIC EXPLANATION 184 (lst ed.
rev. 1974); Dunn, supra note 60, at 656-58.
150. Engstrom et al:, supra note 2, at 495.
151. Karlan, supra note 53, at 235.
152. Id. at 234-35 n.255.
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quite racially polarized,"' it appears that the black candidates won due
to plumping by black voters (as opposed to "cross-overs" by whites).
Finally, in South Dakota school board elections using cumulative voting,
an astounding 93.4% 54of Native American voters plumped for a Native
American candidate. 1

Furthermore, an exit poll in the South Dakota election showed that
90.1% of Native American voters and 88.8% of whites understood that
they could cast multiple votes for the same candidate. l5 Furthermore,
"[iun response to a question concerning whether the system was more
difficult to understand than those used in other elections in which they
had voted, 89.4 percent of the Native Americans and 84.9% of the Anglos
15 6
answered in the negative.'

The less favorable results of Illinois' cumulative voting experiment are
due to Illinois' unique rules. Illinois law allowed voters to cast fractional
votes and did not specify all valid ways of casting a ballot. As a result,
even constitutional convention delegates who debated cumulative voting
disagreed as to the number of ways one could legally mark a cumulative
voting ballot. 5 7 Moreover, Illinois election rules required election clerks
to make mathematical calculations. For example, one "tally sheet" given
by the Illinois secretary of state to election clerks told clerks that they
should "give" a candidate three votes if a voter voted for only one
candidate, one and one-half voters if the voter voted for two, and one
vote if the voter voted for three. 58 If voters had been told that they
could not cast more than one vote for a candidate unless they marked
his name more than once, such instructions would have been unnecessary.
By contrast, in Alamogordo, "[tihe voting machine ballot was very
straightforward. There were three voting levers over every candidate's
name, and voters were informed (in both English and Spanish) that they
could pull any three of the levers."' 5 9 Thus, in Alamogordo, election
clerks were not required to interpret a voter's intent, and voters could
not try to cast multiple votes in other elections. It therefore appears that
cumulative voting will not confuse voters if fractional votes are outlawed
and voters are given clear directions as to how to cast their votes.
4. Does Cumulative Voting Make Legislatures Too Large?
It has been argued that cumulative voting requires either legislatures
or districts to be unusually large. For instance, under cumulative voting
Illinois' state House included 177 legislators-more than all but four

153. Edward Still, Cumulative Voting and Limited Voting in Alabama, in UNITED STATES ELECTORAL
183, 193-95 (Wilma Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman
eds. 1992).
154. Engstrom & Barrilleaux, supra note 81, at 391.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Dunn, supra note 60, at 656.
158. Id. at 656-57.
159. Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 483.
SYSTEMS: THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES
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other state legislative chambers.160 As a result, the legislators had no
personal staff, unlike legislators in smaller chambers.1 6 , Nevertheless, the
House was more than twice as expensive as the State Senate (which was
62
smaller because it was elected through single-member districts).'
Illinois could have solved this problem by reducing the number of
legislators-but to do so, it would have had to reduce the number of
districts, thereby creating unusually populous House districts. For example,
in order to reduce its House membership to 105 (as recommended by
several citizens' groups), 63 Illinois would have had to reduce the number
64
of districts to 35, and each district would have contained 317,542 people' almost three-quarters as many as the average Illinois congressional district. 65 Moreover, some districts would have encompassed a truly immense
geographical area, because even under a 59-district system, one district
"consisted of eleven counties and was larger in size than the states of
Rhode Island and Delaware combined."' 66 By contrast, if the state had
created 105 single-member districts, a 105-member House would include
only 105,847 people per district.1 67 Thus, cumulative voting forces legislatures to choose between creating gigantic legislative bodies with reasonably sized districts (e.g., the Ilinois legislature under cumulative voting)
or a small legislative body with gigantic districts.
However, this problem is avoidable in smaller states and cities, where
even if there are few or no subdistricts, a legislator represents a fairly
small number of people and is therefore easily accessible. For example,
in a city with 10,000 people, a city council member represents far fewer
voters than an Illinois state legislator, even if all council members are
elected citywide. It follows that cumulative voting is most appropriate
in small states and cities, as opposed to big states like Illinois and big
cities such as New York or Los Angeles.' 68

160. Dunn, supra note 60, at 644-45.
161. Id. at 660.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 646. 1 note in passing that since cumulative voting was abolished, the House has
included 118 members. ABSTRACT, supra note 30, at 279.
164. Dunn, supra note 60 at 646.
165. See MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS at 233 (1972 ed.) (noting
that a congressional district which was only 1% less populated than state average included 458,872
people).
166. Dunn, supra note 60, at 645.
167. Id.at 646.
168. Of course, the above analysis begs the question, "How large is too large?" This question
in turn depends on the resolution of five other questions:
1. Should a legislature have any districting at all?
2. If so, how many legislators is "too many" for the legislature to function effectively?
3. How many legislators can be elected per district without forcing voters to choose among a
abnormally large number of candidates?
4. Conversely, how many legislators per district is "too few" to ensure minority representation?
5. How many people is "too many" for a district?
For example, if we assume that (1)five legislators per district is the largest number appropriate,
(2) each district may include as many as 100,000 people, and (3) the maximum appropriate number
of council members or state legislators is 50 (so that there will be 10 council districts), a city (or
state) with a million or more people can have cumulative voting without having unduly large
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5. Does Cumulative Voting Reduce Political Competition?
It has been argued that cumulative voting reduces political competition,
at least in partisan elections. 69 However, the consequences of cumulative
voting for political competition in partisan elections differ depending on
whether parties have absolute power to limit the number of candidates
selected, parties are required to run enough candidates to ensure that
there are more candidates than seats, or a "full slate rule" is in use,
requiring the parties to run full candidate slates (i.e. one candidate per
party for every seat). Accordingly, the subsequent sections will address
the consequences of each possible rule and cumulative voting in nonpartisan elections.
a. Cumulative Voting Without Full Slate Rules
Proponents of cumulative voting suggest that the elimination of gerrymandering increases political competition. 70 However, Illinois' experiment
with cumulative voting suggests otherwise. In 1,776 Illinois House elections
between 1902 and 1969, only 17 districts ever had as many as five
candidates (i.e. three majority party, two minority party) for the three
available seats per district. 7' Typically, the majority of districts were
uncontested-that is, only three candidates ran for the three available
seats. 72 Indeed, some supporters of cumulative voting actually treated
Illinois' lack of political competition as an advantage, by suggesting that
the Illinois House's stability made it more effective than legislatures
comelected under single-member districting (which increased political
73
incumbents).
to
favorable
less
therefore
was
and
petition,
What went wrong in Illinois? In Illinois, the parties could limit the
number of candidates nominated. 74 As a result, parties could (and frequently did) prohibit general election competition by limiting the number
of nominees per district to two (for the majority party) or one (for the
minority party). Parties had a strong incentive to do this, because if a
party runs too many candidates it will fragment its vote and win fewer
seats than it could otherwise. For example, if the minority party runs
only one candidate in a three-seat district, it will nearly always win the
seat because its voters will plump for that candidate. By contrast, if the

legislatures or unduly large districts. Under this standard, cumulative voting would be reasonable
in all but 10 cities, see ABSTRACT, supra note 30, at 42, and in 6 states, id. at xii. However, the
correct answers to these questions will probably be determined through trial and error.
169. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 646-47.
170. See Guinier, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that single-member districts may reduce voter turnout
by promoting gerrymandering).
171. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 646.
172. Id. at 647, 662. See also GILBERT Y. STEINER "& SAMUEL K. GovE, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN
ILLINOIS 6 (1960) (typically, only 40-50% of districts contested).
173. See Charles S. Hyneman & J.D. Morgan, Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 32 ILL. L. REV.
12, 12 (1937) (endorsing cumulative voting because of Illinois legislature's "greater stability of
personnel"). Such stability is arguably no longer an advantage today, because the growth of splitticket voting has made incumbents far "safer" than in the early 20th century. See ABSTRACT, supra
note 30, at 277 (over 90% of U.S. House incumbents usually re-elected).
174. Dunn, supra note 60, at 661.
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minority party runs two candidates, it risks losing both seats by fragmenting its own vote. Similarly, the majority party has an incentive to
run only two candidates for three seats, because if the majority party
runs three candidates, the majority party might lose two of them if its
vote is too fragmented. 75 Thus, cumulative voting should not be used
for partisan elections unless the legislature prohibits the parties from
limiting the number of nominees.
It could be argued that even where partisan elections are noncompetitive,
cumulative voting encourages competition within the parties by increasing
competition in party primaries. For example, in Illinois, primary contests
occurred in slightly over half of Illinois House elections between 1966
and 1977, as opposed to 27% of Illinois Senate elections during that
period. 76 Cumulative voting encouraged primary competition within the
minority party by giving minority party candidates a chance to win general
elections in otherwise noncompetitive districts, thereby making minority
party nominations more attractive. 77 However, "primary elections are
typically for the 'party faithful' and ... are often held many months
before the general election.'

' 78

Thus, competitive primaries are no sub-

stitute for competitive general elections.
b. Cumulative Voting With Modified Full Slate Rules
During the last decade of cumulative voting, Illinois tried to increase
political competition by adopting a modified full slate rule. In 1970,
Illinois amended its state constitution to prohibit parties "from limiting
the number of candidates allowed to run in a general election to less
than two if two or more aspirants had sought the party's nomination(s)
in the primary election.'

79

As a result,

172 of 177 House elections

between 1972 and 1976 involved four major-party candidates for three
seats. 10

175. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
176. Wiggins & Petty, supra note 75, at 349. 1 note that the Illinois House's high rate of primary
competition continued after the state enacted a modified full slate rule in 1970. See id. at 350
(primary contests occurred in 47.6% of all districts between 1966 and 1970, and in 53.6% in all
districts between 1972 and 1976).
177. Id. at 350-51. Similarly, cumulative voting may have increased competition within the majority
party by allowing majority party candidates to win seats even when one of the majority party's
incumbents was unbeatable.
178. Dunn, supra note 60, at 647.
179. Wiggins & Petty, supra note 75, at 348. The state apparently did not adopt a pure full
slate rule (requiring the parties to run three candidates per district) because of fears that if all
voters voted a "straight party ticket," all three majority party, candidates would be elected, thereby
undermining minority representation. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 662-63 (noting that some legislators
feared that even modified rule would have this result).
180. Wiggins & Petty, supra note 75, at 357. Not one race involved more than four candidates,
and some involved only three candidates because only three bothered to run. See id. I note in
passing that the reason the majority party failed to nominate three candidates for any district may
have been that in a close election, the majority would lose two of the three seats if the majority
party vote was split among three candidates, while minority party voters plumped for two candidates.
See supra note 776 and accompanying text; George H. Hallett, Jr., Proportional Representation
with the Single Transferable Vote.- A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections, in CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 113, 116 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds.
1984).
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Although modified full slate rules ensure some degree of interparty
competition, they have a variety of undesirable effects. For example,
under Illinois' rule, the two majority party candidates were virtually
guaranteed election, while the two minority party candidates were required
to battle each other for the "minority seat."
Minority party candidates could obtain the minority seat in three ways,
all of which might have adverse consequences for the political system as
a whole. First, the candidates could try to persuade majority party voters
to "cross over" by casting two of their three votes for majority party
candidates and a third for a minority party candidate. Such crossover
voting could permit the majority to have a great impact on the election
results by effectively electing the minority party candidate of their choice. 8 '
This result would subvert the "minority representation" rationale for
cumulative voting. Even before the modified full slate rule was adopted
in Illinois, such collusion occurred in Illinois House elections. For example,
sometimes "the two incumbent majority party candidates and the one
incumbent minority candidate [would] 'play down' differences among
them in the interest in creating a united front ... [against] any potential
challenger."' 82
Second, minority party incumbents could try to ensure their election
by selecting "decoy" candidates. A "decoy" candidate is a weak candidate
recruited by a minority party incumbent (or a well-organized non-incumbent) to run for one of the party's two slots. The early entry of the
decoy would discourage more qualified minority party candidates from
contesting the minority party primary, and if the decoy was nominated,
he would not campaign in the general election (thereby causing the
minority party incumbent to be effectively unopposed).' 83 Although it is
unclear how frequently decoys were used in Illinois, 8 4 their existence
suggests that even laws requiring political competition might fail to ensure
such competition.
Third, minority party candidates could try to ensure their election by
encouraging minority party voters to plump for them and to ignore the
minority party's other candidate. Thus, general elections would essentially
be turned into party primaries in which the minority party candidates
would ignore the majority party and attack each other.' 85
Such intraparty warfare is arguably undesirable because it interferes
with the public interest in cohesive, competitive parties. One purpose of
political parties is to allow people with "similar views [to] organize to
contend for control of the government."' 18 6 Parties do this by "defin[ing]

181. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 663 (quoting opponent of full slate rule in Illinois constitutional
convention) (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 648 (quoting remarks of former House Minority Leader) (citation omitted).
183. Wiggins & Petty, supra note 75, at 361.
184. Id.
185. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 649 (noting that even before Illinois enacted modified full slate
rule, such intraparty warfare was frequent where minority party ran two candidates in a district).
186. 17 Encyclopedia Britannica 423 (1966 ed.).
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the issues before the electorate in campaigns and elections. They present
to the electorate not only a choice among candidates but a choice among
governmental programs."' 8 7 But where a party's candidates campaign
entirely against each other and ignore the opposition, the electorate has
no real "choice among governmental programs." Additionally, under a
cumulative voting system minority party legislators may have no incentive
to agree on a coherent program or to emphasize their disagreements with
the majority party. For example, if two Republican candidates are campaigning for the one "Republican seat" in a heavily Democratic district,
they can persuade voters to support them only by emphasizing their
disagreements with each other, because the candidates' disagreements with
the Democrats are not particularly relevant to a voter's choice between
Republican candidates.
In sum, even where some political competition exists, cumulative voting
in partisan elections may lead to collusion between the parties, efforts
to avoid rules requiring general election competition (such as decoy
candidacies) and intraparty warfare which makes parties less effective.
c. Cumulative Voting With Full Slate Rules
Finally, a jurisdiction with cumulative voting could try to mandate
electoral competition by requiring every political party to run a "full
slate"-that is, to run as many candidates as there were seats available.
The most obvious advantage of a full slate rule is that it reduces the
amount of "cross over" voting by majority party voters, because majority
party voters would have to forego voting for a majority party candidate
in order to cast one of their votes for a minority party candidate.
Furthermore, a full slate rule makes decoy candidacies less likely, because
a candidate would need to find two or more decoy candidates, which
would be more difficult than finding only one such candidate.
On the other hand, a full slate rule risks shutting out the minority
party, thereby frustrating the "minority representation" rationale for
cumulative voting. 8" For example, suppose each party nominates four
candidates in a four-member legislative district. If each party member
votes a "straight party ticket," the majority party will win all four seats
(thereby wasting minority party members' votes). In order to obtain any
seats at all, minority party legislative candidates would be forced to
campaign against each other by asking their own party's voters to plump
for one or more minority party candidates and ignore the rest.
For example, in Chilton County, Alabama, where both parties have
run full slates in elections held under cumulative voting, 8 9 the minority
party (the Republicans) has been able to elect three members to each of

187.
188.
rule).
189.
ran in

Id.
See Dunn, supra note 60, at 662-63 (expressing similar concerns about modified full slate
See Still, supra note 153, at 189-90 (tables showing that seven candidates from each party
county elections).
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the county's major legislative bodies (the board of education and the
county commission, each of which have seven members).1 90 However, the
gap between the leading Republican and the seventh-place Republican is
sometimes far larger than the gap between the leading Democrat and the
seventh-place Democrat. In 1988, the leading Republican Board of Education candidate received more than six times as many votes as the lastplace Republican candidate, while the leading Democrat received less than
twice as many votes as the last-place Democrat. 19' Thus, it appears that
Republicans have been able to elect candidates only by plumping for
their favorite Republicans and ignoring the rest' 92-a strategy which, as
noted above, risks turning every general election into a battle within the
minority party. 19a
Such intraparty division is less problematic in a small local government
(such as the Chilton County school board) than in a state or federal
government. In national and state government, elections tend to be about
ideological differences. Thus, the public has a strong interest in being
able to choose between unified, ideologically coherent parties which can
be held collectively accountable if their programs fail. By contrast, in
small-town governments, ideologically divisive issues such as crime and
economic policy will be of little relevance, because such problems are
primarily statewide or national in nature. Thus, politics will often focus
1 94
on personalities, and the public interest in strong parties is less pressing.
It follows that the intraparty division caused by cumulative voting is
most problematic in state and federal elections, and least problematic in
small-town elections.
d. Cumulative Voting in Nonpartisan Elections
As noted above, cumulative voting generally reduces or distorts competition in partisan elections. By contrast, in nonpartisan elections, the
parties cannot limit the number of effective candidates through their
control over the nomination process. Thus, nonpartisan elections will
include a large number of candidates even if major political parties are
not involved in the process (or if the parties collude to limit the number
of party-sponsored candidates). Indeed, cumulative voting may actually
increase competition in nonpartisan elections by giving minorities a chance
to elect candidates of their choice.
For example, in Alamogordo's first non-partisan election under cumulative voting, 95 eight candidates ran for three seats.' % By contrast,

190. Id.
191. Id. at 189.
192. Of course, it is also possible that Republicans have benefitted from Democratic "cross over
votes." As noted above, I believe that crossover voting is probably less frequent where the parties
run full slates. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (explaining disadvantages of intraparty division).
194. To quote one of my college professors, "There's no Republican or Democratic way to pick
up the garbage."
195. See Engstrom et. al, supra note 2, at 484-85 (showing sample ballot which did not list party
affiliation).
196. See Karlan, supra note 53, at 233.
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Illinois' partisan House elections almost never involved more than four
candidates for three seats. 97 Moreover, the Alamogordo elections apparently involved a large number of serious candidates, because the gap
between the strongest and weakest candidates was no larger than in some
partisan elections. In Alamogordo, the first-place candidate had about
six and one-half times as many votes as the last-place candidate' 98almost identical to the first place/last place gap in Chilton County's
school board election. 199
In sum, it appears that cumulative voting both limits and distorts
political competition in partisan elections by giving parties an incentive
to run as few candidates as possible, allowing the majority party to select
minority party legislators through "cross over" votes, and encouraging
minority party candidates to attack each other rather than the opposition.
By contrast, cumulative voting may increase competition in nonpartisan
elections. Thus, cumulative voting should be disfavored in partisan elections, especially state, federal and big-city elections where parties are
ordinarily ideologically distinctive.
6. The Dangers of Strategic Voting
One possible disadvantage of cumulative voting concerns the voters'
ability to use their votes prudently. A faction's strength depends not only
on how many supporters it has, but on how well they distribute their
votes. For instance, suppose Still County has 60 blacks and 50 whites
(excluding county commission candidates), 6 county commission candidates of each race, and a six-member commission elected through cumulative voting. If all 60 blacks plump for 1 candidate and all whites
cast 1 vote for each of 6 candidates, 1 black candidate will receive 360
votes, each white candidate will receive 50 votes, and the remaining black
candidates will receive no votes (except for their own). Thus, the Still
County Commission would have a 5-1 white majority, even though the
county is two-thirds black. This would hardly be an equitable outcome. 2°°
Similarly, a majority can turn itself into a minority through inadequate
plumping. 20 1 For example, if Still County's black voters split their votes
evenly among all 6 candidates, while white voters concentrated their 6
votes among 4 candidates, 4 of the white candidates could get the

197. See Wiggins & Petty, supra note 75, at 357.
198. See Engstrom et al., supra note 2, at 488.
199. See Still, supra note 153, at 189. The Alamogordo "first place/last place" gap was 6.53,
while the Chilton County "first place/last place" gap was 6.47. But cf. id. at 190 (gap between
candidates far smaller for Chilton County commission).
200. Although my hypothetical is so extreme as to be fanciful, there are real-life examples of
groups electing fewer officials than they could have due to incorrect voting strategies. See Engstrom
& Barrilleaux, supra note 81, at 391 (South Dakota native American voters could have elected two
school board members in first election held under cumulative voting, but elected only one because
majority plumped for one candidate). Cf. Guinier, supra note 5, at 96 (noting probability of
"strategic voting" under cumulative voting system).
201. Moreover, a minority group could also wholly deprive itself of representation by splitting
its vote among numerous candidates. See Dunn, supra note 60, at 662-63 (noting possibility that
limited full slate rule could deprive minority of representation) (citations omitted).
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equivalent of 1.5 votes from each white voter (by receiving 2 votes from
half the white voters and 1 from the other half), thus giving the 4 whites
75 votes each (as compared to the blacks' 60). Thus, the white minority
would have a 4-2 commission majority.
Such bizarre outcomes (although never totally impossible) are far more
likely in some circumstances than in others. For example, if one faction
has a stable majority (e.g., in a city 7007 white or 70% black) and both
majority and minority voters are aware of their status, both groups will
probably act rationally; the minority will plump for a small number of
candidates in order to ensure their election, while the majority will disperse
its votes among a wider number of candidates in order to preserve its
majority.
It therefore follows that cumulative voting should be disfavored where
most voters are uncertain about whether they are in the majority faction.
Such uncertainty can arise in two situations. First, voters may be uncertain
about their status where political or racial factions are so closely balanced
that there is no clear majority. Second, voters may be unaware of their
status where they do not know what the balance of power is in their
district. This means that cumulative voting should be especially disfavored
in any situation where districting is required, because even the small
number of voters who know the identity of all their legislators are not
likely to be aware of the political situation in other neighborhoods in
their district. Cumulative voting should also be highly disfavored in bigcity elections, because even if -voters may know the racial or political
makeup of their own neighborhood, they may have no idea what the
balance of power is in their city as a whole. 20 2 In addition, big-city
electorates are so large that voters could probably not be organized to
vote rationally.
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article was to answer one narrow question: when
should courts, legislators and litigators prefer cumulative voting to singlemember districting? I conclude that cumulative voting is often superior
to single-member districting because it is more effective in increasing
minority representation and eliminates gerrymandering. Specifically, cumulative voting is superior in small cities and states, nonpartisan jurisdictions and jurisdictions with a stable majority faction or party.

202. For example, my home town of Atlanta has some virtually all-white areas within the city
limits, and some virtually all-black areas within the city limits. Residents of the first group of
neighborhoods may erroneously believe that the city is majority white, while residents of the second
group of neighborhoods may be unaware that about one-third of city residents are white. See
ABSTRACT, supra note 30, at 42. Where a city is large enough to be surrounded by suburbs, erroneous
guesses about the balance of power will be especially common, because voters may confuse the city
with the metro area or vice versa. See, e.g., Channel 46 Evening News (Tribune televigion broadcast,
July 27, 1994) (erroneously describing Atlanta as only 25% black, presumably because newscaster
confused city, which is two-thirds black, with metro area, which is majority white). Because of
such miscalculations, cumulative voting for Atlanta city council elections could lead to either a
white majority council, an all-black council, or any possible result in between.
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Small cities and states are well-suited for cumulative voting for three
reasons. First, gerrymandering is impossible where a jurisdiction is so
small that no districting is necessary. Second, cumulative voting in larger
cities and states requires legislatures to either create unusually populous
districts or to have an unusually large number of legislators. Third, voters
in a small city are more likely to know the area's political or racial
balance, and thus would be more aware of how to maximize their group's
representation. Additionally, where a municipality is so small that no
districting is required, voters are especially likely to be knowledgeable
about the "balance of power" throughout the entire community as
opposed to their own neighborhood.
Cumulative voting is also appropriate in jurisdictions with nonpartisan
elections, because in such jurisdictions parties cannot limit competition
by limiting the number of effective candidates. By contrast, in jurisdictions
with partisan elections, cumulative voting usually reduces political competition because the parties may collude to limit the number of candidates.
The anticompetitive effects of cumulative voting in partisan elections can
be limited by a statutory requirement that both parties nominate full
slates of candidates-but at a heavy cost. In jurisdictions with both
cumulative voting and full slate rules, minority party candidates will not
be elected unless minority party voters plump for some candidates and
ignore the rest. Thus, cumulative voting in such jurisdictions encourages
intraparty warfare, because minority party candidates will fight each other
for their partisans' support. As party cohesion is less socially useful in
smaller jurisdictions, the use of cumulative voting in such jurisdictions
should not result in the same problems as its use in larger jurisdictions
with partisan elections.
Finally, the use of cumulative voting is appropriate in jurisdictions
with a clear majority race or majority party. Where a jurisdiction is
dominated by one group, voters are more likely to know if they are in
the majority. Consequently, they are more likely to vote rationally and
maximize their group's representation. By contrast, if a city is evenly
divided between factions (or if it is so large that most voters do not
know whether they are in the majority), cumulative voting can turn a
majority into a minority if the majority's voting strategy is inappropriate.
In sum, cumulative voting is appropriate in some situations, and less
so in others. Litigators, legislators, and judges should support cumulative
voting in small, nonpartisan, local elections, but not in most big-city or
statewide elections.

